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Scholars concerned with problems of economic development have tended
either to ignore the entrepreneur or to enshrine him as the prime mover of
the economic universe.
This dichotomy in approach is hardly surprising since conventional
economic theory assumes—and in the absence of a central planning board,
requires—the presence of profit maximizing entrepreneurs, calculating profits
with lightning speed and unerring precision. Indeed, the entrepreneur in
this schema is not easily identified with flesh and blood, but is rather a
deus ex machina . This is not to deprecate economic theory but merely to
agree with Baumol that while the theory of the firm is useful for many pur-
poses it leaves no room for treating entrepreneurship in other than a trivial
way. [4]
On the other hand, many social scientists have had occasion to observe
that in some underdeveloped economies there appears to be a lack of response
to economic incentives. They have turned to psychological or sociological
explanations for the emergence (or lack, of emergence) of entrepreneurial
groups. [38, 14] Hagen expresses the position quite well when he states
that "In a traditional society in which nothing has yet occurred to change
traditional personality and culture, an increase in the size of the market or
in the flow of saving available is not apt to have a great effect in inducing
continuing change in technology." [22]
The purposes of this paper are two. First, to present a conceptual
framework for analyzing relationships between social, political, and economic
variables; entrepreneurshipl and economic growth. And secondly, to present
some empirical findings from Nigeria.
2.
Although many definitions of entrepreneurship have appeared in the
literature, a common thread running throughout the various discussions is
that the entrepreneur is a decision maker. It seems most useful to identify
entrepreneurship with the function of making decisions with regard to levels
of production and productive techniques (the "what" and "how" of elementary
economics) rather than solely with individuals. As such, the function may
be carried out by an individual or by a group. It may involve producing
novel goods, or finding new means of producing familiar goods—this is in-
novational activity. It will usually involve creating additional productive
capacity prior to undertaking production— thus bearing considerable risk.
It may involve expanding production along familiar lines
—
yet imitative
activity too requires decision making. The actual decisions made in any
economy will range from difficult to easy, from "once in a lifetime" to
routine. However nice it would be to distinguish between important and rou-
tine decisions, between innovation and imitation, it is virtually impossible
to draw a dividing line that is operationally satisfactory, because the
decisions made in any economy form a continuum and any division is at best
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arbitrary.
The tasks that must be performed by entrepreneurial units if decisions
are to be effective include: perceiving productive opportunities, gaining
control over other factors of production, organizing productive facilities,
and in some cases managing the continuing operation of the operation of the
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productive facilities. It may be desirable to separate the last task from
the others, but, again, it is in practice difficult to separate management
from decision making.
The relationship between entrepreneurship and economic development
should at once be apparent. Other things being equal, an economy with a
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larger supply of effective decision makers will make better use of its
potential resources since they will be combined more efficiently and will
be used for more productive purposes. (This is the principal argument of
Hirschman. [27] ) It is also clear that for a given level of entrepreneurial
resources an economy will achieve higher levels of output if it has greater
endowments of resources and potential opportunities for growth are more
favorable.
One way to attack the problem analytically is to treat entrepreneurial
resources as a factor of production. This has been suggested by Harbison
[23] and I have worked it out in some detail earlier. [24, Ch. 2] As
between conventional factors, there are relationships both of substituta-
bility and complementarity between entrepreneurship and other factors.
Following from a standard production-function approach, demand for entre-
preneurial resources can be derived as a function of price and a supply
function for the factor can be specified. Such a model leads one to con-
sider factors affecting both the demand for and supply of entrepreneurship.
Broadly speaking, economic factors determine the "demand" for entrepreneur-
ship while social and psychological forces along with economic factors
determine the supply. Some interesting propositions can be derived from
the comparative static and comparative dynamic properties of such a model
that are parallel to familiar propositions relating to accumulation of con-
ventional factors such as capital or labour. [24, Ch. 2]
However, such a model fails to come to grips with the difficult prob-
lems of imperfect markets and uncertainty. On the basis of casual empiricism,
one is inclined to believe that the market for entrepreneurial services is
particularly imperfect. Individuals who were "fustest with the mostest"
appear to reap rewards in excess of what could be considered rent for
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superior skill alone. Luck plays at least some part. In our definition
of entrepreneurship, the first function listed was the perception of oppor-
tunities; this is a necessary and important function only if information
concerning opportunities is limited and imperfect. It is the fact that
entrepreneurial decisions are necessarily taken under conditions of uncer-
tainty that makes the study of entrepreneurship interesting.
With a production-function approach, one can identify equilibrium
quantities and prices determined by the intersections of demand and supply
curves only if a single price prevails for all units of the factor. If
instead, one wishes to consider a heterogeneous group of projects, each
with a different rate of return, it is possible to determine neither how
many of these projects, nor which ones will be exploited without specifying
some mechanism for linking particular entrepreneurial units with specific
projects. Therefore it is desirable to formulate a model which explicitly
takes into account the complications of non-homogenous projects, imperfect
information, and risk.
Consider the objects of entrepreneurial decisions to be discrete pro-
jects which, if implemented, have the effect of increasing total output.
They may require new investment or may consist solely of reorganizing existing
productive structures. Each project can be completely described by its
attributes which include expected payoff, variance of expected payoff, length
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of payoff period, necessary scale of operations, technical complexity, etc.
Thus, each project can be considered to be a bundle of attributes denoted
by a vector
(1) X. = X. (x. , x„ , . .
.
, X,)
where X. is the jth project and the x 's are scale values for each of the
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k attributes, representing a point in a k-dimensional attribute space. The
X scales will be constructed so that a state with higher value will be
preferred to a state associated with a lower value. Thus we assume that a
higher expected payoff, a lower variance of expected payoff (risk), less
technological complexity, and smaller scale of operation will always be
preferred to their opposites.
Entrepreneurial functions are performed by decision units which may
be individuals, households, or organizations, each of which is assumed to
be able to order all attribute bundles according to the relations X PX or
X PX
,
(the first meaning X is preferred to X , the second meaning X is
1 9
'
not preferred to X ) . Following'conventional consumer theory, transitivity
1 12 2
is assumed; that is, X PX and X PX implies X PX . These two assumptions
(or axioms) together imply a total ordering of the entire set of attribute
bundles (projects) by each decision unit. Let us also assume a continuous,
k k
-i k 1
order preserving, monotone function, u (X), such that u (X ) _ u (X ) if and
only if X is ordered before, or on the same level as X by the kth decision
unit (X PX or X PZ and XT'X ). These assumptions imply the existence of
a system of indifference surfaces, which are assumed to be convex to the
. .
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origin.
In a world of imperfect information, no decision unit is able to ascertain
the full universe of potential alternatives. Instead of choosing between all
possible alternatives 5 a decision unit usually is faced at any one moment with
a single opportunity for which a decision to act or not act must be made.
Let us assume that each decision unit determines some critical indif-
k ->ference surface u , We then define the set A, such that if X.eA^, u (X.) -
k k
1 where u
c c
u_ is the critical indifference surface and A^ is the action set of
the kth decision unit,
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The following simple, but not implausible, decision rule can be postu-
lated: if the kth decision unit perceives a potential project X , it will
be acted upon (exploited) if X eA^ ; if X.^A^ it will not be acted upon.
Figure 1 depicts the action set of the kth individual projected on to a
two dimensional plane (all other attributes being of specified and unchanging
value). For purposes of illustration, x^ can be the expected profits, and
X- an inverse function of the variance of the expected profits, hence a
measure of risk. The action set. A, , is represented by the shaded half-
k > k
space, containing all projects such that u (X.) - u . Hence, if either
k kprojects X or X. (which have associated levels of preference, u and u,
respectively, each > u ) were to come to the attention of the kth decision
k k
unit, they would be exploited. If X^ (associated with u < u were to be
perceived as a potential opportunity, it would not be exploited.
It
The position of the u 's depend on several factors including preferences,
access to resources, skills, a subjective notion of the nature of opportunities
that are likely to arise in the future, and on projects already being ex-
ploited by the decision unit. That is, a decision unit will decide not to
exploit a project because it finds the particular project unattractive per se
,
because it thinks something better will be available in the future, or because
its resources are already fully extended. Therefore a complication arises
if X. and X. were observed simultaneously by decision unit k. It is clear
that X. would be preferred to X. in such a case, but X. also lies in the
J 1 1
action set. Exploitation of X. will most likely alter the position of u
because organizational and resource constraints exist for most decision units.
One way to handle the problem is to assume that decisions are made seriatim.
\^
X is exploited, u shifts and X. is exploited depending on whether or not
J ex
it lies within the new A^. Perhaps a more satisfactory approach is to
XFigure 1: The kth Decisions Unit's Action Set
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consider three mutually exclusive projects; X , X,, and a new project X^
which consists of simultaneous exploitation of X and X . It has frequently
been pointed out in the literature that a complex of projects may afford
possibilities of internalization of externalities and pooling of risks,
hence the complex is different from the sum of its parts. The decision unit
then chooses the one alternative that it ranks highest.
Another possible line of inquiry would be to introduce explicitly a
cost of searching for alternatives and explore the conditions under which
a decision unit will pay to obtain additional information. However, this
12promising approach will not be pursued further in this paper.
In this model, the exploitation of a project depends on the configuration
of the u 's, the constellation of potential projects, and whether or not
decision units perceive the potential projects. So far the problem has been
perceived from the standpoint of the individual decision unit. Since econo-
mic growth is related directly to the number and kinds of projects exploited
in a period of time, it will be useful to examine the model from the stand-
point of the economy as a whole.
Suppose that the economy consists of n decision units and at a particu-
lar moment there exist m potential projects. \That is the chance that any
particular project will be exploited? We can write
n
(2) N(X ) = Z e 6 = if X. ^ A^
J v=i ^ k J K
\=li^^j^\.
where N(X.) is the number of decision units which would be willing to ex-
ploit the jth project if they became aware of its existence. A simple and
not unreasonable assumption is that the probability that the jth project will
be exploited will be a positive function of N(X ), the flow of information,
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and the intensity of search for projects by decision units. This can be
written as
(3) (X^) = p^[N(Xj),I], < Pj < 1, 3pj/ Nj > 0, dpjdl I 0,
where p.(X ) is the probability of the jth project being exploited, and I
is a variable representing both information and intensity of search by the
decision units.
Therefore, expected increase in national output can be written as
n
(4) E(AY) = E p.E(AY ),
where E stands for expected value E(AY.) is the expected incremental output
if project j is actually exploited, and p, is the probability of its being
exploited. It is important to note that while the P . 's are normally depen-
dent on private profitability, the E(AY.)'s reflect social profitability.
(If public sector decision units explicitly consider social profitability as
their decision criterion, some modification of the model may be required.)
It is apparent that the expected rate of economic growth will be greater,
the larger are the number of projects, the incremental output associated with
each, and the p.'s. In turn, the p.'s will be larger, the greater are the
N.'s, the better the network of information, and the more intensive the search
J
by decision units for projects.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between p and one attribute, x^ , which
might be taken to be expected profit. With the population of decision units
and their (not identical) u 's given, and for constant values of all other
c
attributes, p is seen to be monotone increasing function of x^. That is,
ceteris paribus , the higher is the expected return, the greater is the proba-
bility that any project will be exploited. Similar reasoning can be extended
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Figure 2: Probability of Exploitation as a Function
of Project Attribute
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to other attributes. This follows from the assumption that there is unanimity
among decision units in ranking the order of preference of each attribute
k k
and that the u 's are not identical. (If the u 's were identical, N. would
c c ' J
jump from to ri at u(X ) = u .)
An increase in the number of decision units, a shift towards the
origin of some of the u 's, an improvement in the information system, or an
increase in the intensity of search will shift the function upwards, say
from p to p^
.
So far it has been implicitly assumed that all decision units hold
identical expectations of profitability, risk, complexity, etc., with regard
to a particular project if they become aware of it at all. This, of course,
begs the important question of how subjective views of the characteristics
of a project are formed. Psychological studies of cognition and perception
indicate that different individuals will hold widely divergent opinions about
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the objective characteristics of any object. However, it is beyond the
scope of the present study to deal with this important matter. If the in-
dividual estimates of an attribute of a project are randomly distributed,
the qualitative characteristics of this model are unaffected if the X.'s
reflect the mean values of the attributes. Alternatively, the problem can
be avoided by assuming that there is an "objective' value of each attribute
which is reflected in the vector X
,
and systematic underestimation or over-
estimation of an attribute by a decision unit is reflected in the position
of its u . For instance, the u of a decision unit which is consistently
c c
optimistic about expected returns will lie closer to the origin in the x^
("objective" expected return) direction than it would in the absence of op-
timism. This kind of assumption is necessary to locate projects in the
attribute space and define the N(X.)'s.
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However, decision units will differ not only on their subjective
appreciation of objective reality, but the latter will also differ among
units. Any particular project will be more profitable for decision units
with greater organizational skill or more favourable access to resources
than for less favored decision units. Risk is appreciably diminished for
decision units that are more diversified or that possess more accurate in-
formation about processes and markets. To the extent that a decision unit
possesses general advantages, potential profitability will be enhanced or
risk diminished for any project that it considers. Such differences may
be accommodated through shifting their u 's closer to the origin; the relative
positions of projects in attribute space is unaffected.
In this model, economic factors such as factor supplies, technology,
effective demand, foreign trade possibilities, prices, and institutional
arrangements, can be viajed primarily as determinants of the X.'s. Changes
in any of these variables will change the values of one or more attributes
of any given project. Inventions will create new potential projects and/or
shift the position of existing projects in attribute space. External economies
will be reflected by exploitation of one project shifting the position of
other project vectors, or by the definition of a composite project which will
have a vector different from the sum of the component project vectors.
Projects which are dissimilar to presently exploited opportunities will
involve a high degree of risk, ceteris paribus ; hence, innovation can be con-
sidered as exploitation of high risk projects. It is then apparent that the
act of innovation will reduce the risk component of similar projects, although
it may either increase or decrease expected profit. Thus, imitative entre-
preneurship can be viewed as exploitation of less risky projects, and within
this framework, it is obvious that there will be more imitators than
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innovators in any population of decision units.
Similarly, social and psychological variables will affect the position
k
of the u 's. Changes in personality or societal values will become mani-
c
fest through changing decision unit preference structures; "favourable"
]^
changes will shift the u 's toward the origin in the expected return, pay-
off period, and risk dimensions. Changes in factor prices, hence in at-
tractiveness of alternative occupations, will also shift the u 's in these
same dimensions. Education and occupational experience will shift the u 's
in the technological complexity and organizational scale dimensions.
The development of an organized capital market (or other credit in-
stitutions) will have the effect of shifting the u 's toward the origin in
the scale of operations dimension; decision units will be enabled to exploit
projects of large scale from which they had been precluded. If prestige
is an operational attribute of projects (e.g., industry more prestigious
than trade or agriculture) , changes in societal values will be reflected in
shifts of the X.'s in this dimension. Increased intensity of search for
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entrepreneurial opportunities arising from changed personality or social
values , or an improved information system will be reflected through a shift
in the p.'s for any given set of X.'s and u 's.
The qualitative characteristics of this model are quite similar to
those of a model in which entrepreneurship is treated as a factor or pro-
duction within a production function framework. For the most part, variables
that affect the demand for entrepreneurship in the one affect the X.'s (op-
portunity set) in the other; variables determining the supply of entre-
preneurship in the one determine the N(X.)'s in the other. However, the
model developed here explicitly introduces risk, imperfect information, and
a probabilistic approach to matching entrepreneurial units with specific
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projects. In addition, it deals with heterogeneity of projects and entre-
preneurial units in a more satisfactory manner.
Models of this sort are useful to the extent that they provide a
coherent framework within which entrepreneurship can be investigated. They
avoid a single factor approach to economic development and help one to
identify separately variables affecting the supply of and demand for entre-
preneurship (or alternatively, the set of opportunities and the responsive-
ness to such opportunities).
This framework is capable of accommodating many different experiences.
Papanek has reported a high rate of industrial growth in response to economic
incentives in Pakistan where conditions for a vigorous entrepreneurial
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response seemed relatively lacking. In Greece there has been a long tra-
dition of vigorous entrepreneurship, yet, according to Alexander, industrial
growth has been disappointing because of problems in the economic structure.
We can also think of examples such as the United States and England in which
both the economic environment and entrepreneurial supply were conducive to
rapid growth and of Burma where both factors seem prejudicial to growth.
In a somewhat similar vein, Papanek has aptly pointed out that
The development of industrial entrepreneurs results from
the interaction of three forces—the strength of economic
incentives; the values, institutions and political situation
in the society as a whole; and the motivations of the
potential entrepreneurs. The more favourable for the
development of industrial entrepreneurs one or two of these
factors, the less favourable can be the other one or two
without affecting the results. ^^
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II.
The problem at hand is to derive propositions from the model that are
capable of empirical test.
One group of hypotheses (each to be taken as a ceteris paribus state-
ment) flow directly from particular project attributes and assumed preferences
with respect to these attributes, and to determinants of the information
variable. (The term "industry" refers to groups of projects having rather
similar attributive values.) They are:
(1) The rate of expansion will be higher in industries yielding higher
current profits. The underlying assumption being that expectations
adapt to realizations.
(2) The rate of expansion will be higher in industries with less complex
technology.
(3) The rate of expansion will be higher in industries in which economies
of scale are not great, hence requiring less complex organization and
capital.
(4) The rate of expansion will be highest in industries in which tech-
nological communication between the country and the rest of the world
is most easily facilitated.
(5) Innovations will be relatively rare but successful innovations will
be copied quite rapidly. This process will drive down profits on
similar projects and the rate of adoption will be slowed. This pro-
position rests on two assumptions. First, demonstration reduces the
subjective element of risk associated with a similar project, and,
second, information about a project existing in the country or region
is more readily available than is information about similar projects
existing only outside the country or region.
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A second group of hypotheses are based on factors that should sys-
tematically shift critical indifference surfaces of some decision units
either through affecting expected values of profit, skills and resources,
or attitudes towards some attributes. In particular, the possession of
certain skills and managerial abilities by a decision unit will make any
project that it undertakes more profitable than if the same project were
taken by another decision unit less well endowed. Also, projects charac-
terized by large scale, high risk, or technological complexity will be under-
taken only if they have differentially high expected profits. Therefore,
propositions relating to decision units' critical indifference surfaces in
the scale, risk, and complexity dimensions can be converted into propositions
relating to expected profits. (Expected profits and realized profits are
assumed to be positively correlated through operation of an adaptive expec-
tation mechanism.) These hypotheses (also to be taken as ceteris paribus
statements) are:
(6) Entrepreneurial performance will vary among ethnic groups, since
ethnicity is usually considered to reflect differences in social struc-
ture, sanctions, and child-rearing practices which in turn condition
an individual's (or group's) attitudes towards risk and affect modes
of interpersonal relationships within an organization. These factors
will also affect social and occupational mobility which are also deter-
minants of the critical indifference surfaces.
(7) Entrepreneurs (or decision units) with high levels of formal education
will be found to be earning high profits on the projects they have
exploited. This follows from the assumption that education contributes
to general organizational, managerial, and technical skills as well as
to particular skills which affect the ability to undertake large and
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complex projects. Education and willingness to take risk may be cor-
related; superior access to information may also reduce subjective
risk.
(8) Entrepreneurs (or decision units) with greater experience will be
found to earn high profits on projects they have exploited. The argu-
ment here is parallel with the previous one with regard to formal edu-
cation. Experience should be considered both in terms of years and
in the useable relevance of the particular experience for imparting
useable skills and knowledge.
(9) Entrepreneurs (or decision units) that have innovated will earn dif-
ferentially high profits. This is based on convexity of the action set.
(10) Entrepreneurs (or decision units) with access to credit or other sources
of capital in sizeable amounts will earn higher profits than those who
lack such access. This is based on the notion that access to capital
is an important determinant of the critical indifference curve in the
scale of operation dimension which is in turn related to profit through
convexity of the action set.
(11) Entrepreneurs (or decision units) with good political connections will
earn differentially high profits. This proposition is based on the
fact that political connections are important for gaining access to
resources, credit, and markets on favourable terms.
We now want to confront these theoretical implications with facts from
Nigeria.
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III.
The data used in this paper were collected through interviews with
269 Nigerian firms during 1965. For several reasons the sawmilling, fur-
niture, printing, rubber processing, and garment making industries were
selected for intensive survey. Several other industries including beverages,
lime making, bone crushing, pipeline welding, metal working, electrical equip-
ment, transport equipment, gramaphone record pressing, brick making, sign
making, perfume blending, and tanning, in which only a very few indigenous
firms with more than 20 employees existed, were also included in the survey.
Appendix I contains several tables which describe the characteristics of the
respondent firms. Our best estimate is that this sample includes more than
90% of Nigerian-controlled firms with more than 20 employees in these selec-
ted industries and more than 30% of those firms with more than ten and less
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than 20 employees.
Mrs. Mary P. Rowe conducted all of the interviews in the Lagos area
while I did all of the interviewing outside of Lagos. Each of the interviews
was based on a prepared questionnaire using open-ended questions, and in-
cluded questions about the history, activities, and current financial struc-
ture of each firm; management structure; sources of capital and technical
information; future plans; special obstacles which had been encountered; and
a detailed biography of the founder or principal decision maker in each firm.
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Evidence from detailed studies of the sawinllling, furniture, rubber
processing, printing, and garment making industries is consistent with the
first five hypotheses. [2A, Chs . IV-VIII; 26] Large numbers of
Nigerians have been highly responsive to economic opportunities and incen-
tives within the limits imposed by their particular technical, commercial,
and managerial skills. Industries characterised by relatively high profits,
simple technologies, and low investment thresholds have been expanded rapidly-
more rapidly, in fact, than would appear to be economically optimal since
most are working at rather low levels of capacity utilization. On the other
hand, there has been relatively little private African participation in
large-scale industrial activities which have been undertaken by expatriates
and to an increasing extent by governments. The pattern of rapid adoption
of successful innovations with attendant decline in profits has been striking
in Nigerian industries and is consistent with hypothesis (5). Contacts with
overseas firms have been important in determining the speed of expansion in
rubber processing industries, while expansion of sawmilling and printing
firms accelerated sharply after the establishment of Nigerian branches by
equipment suppliers. These branches offer excellent service and training
in use of their equipment as well as information and technical advice.
IV.
Propositions (6) -(11) each posit a systematic relationship between
observed profitability of firms and observable characteristics of decision
makers. (In the theory these characteristics are associated with decision
units which may consist of several individuals while in the propositions
these are characteristics attributable to individuals. Since the sample
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consists of firms dominated in almost all cases by a single individual, this
presents no particular problem. If the sample had included many multi-person
decision units, definition and measurement of characteristics would have
had to have been modified considerably.)
First, it might be useful to specify the form of the posited relation-
ships more precisely. Each of the propositions should be interpreted as
a ceteris paribus statement. A particularly simple form of the relation-
ships arises if one assumes that the characteristics are independent of
each other and that they affect the dependent variable, profitability, in
an additive manner. This can be written symbolically as:
(5) Pr = C + a,Ind + a_Eth + a^Ed + a, Exp + a^Inov + a,Res + a^Pol + u
1 2 3 45 6 7
where Pr is profitability, C is a constant, Ind is specific industry or
regional effects, Eth is ethnic group membership, Ed is education, Exp is
relevant experience, Inov is innovational activity. Res is access to re-
sources, Pol is political involvement, and u is a random error term. This
is, of course, an extremely simple specification of the hypothesized re-
lationships, but it does provide a useful and convenient starting point.
The next problem is to devise operational definitions of each of the variables
and to specify how they are to be measured.
Unfortunately, although the theory suggests some general qualitative
relationships, there is little a priori basis for choosing the precise ways
in which the variables should be measured. Therefore, one is forced to
experiment with alternative measures to determine how sensitive the analysis
is to choice of measure. Of course, such a procedure contaminates the re-
sults and reduces the extent to which one can claim to have tested the hy-
potheses.
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Tl\e appropriate measure of profits in this model is of economic
profit—earnings in excess of opportunity cost of all employed and owned
factors. Thus it is an amount of profit rather than a rate, can can be
viewed as a return to entrepreneurship or organization. However, it was
impossible to obtain satisfactory data on profit from all of the firms in
the sample.
However, our survey showed quite conclusively that retained earnings
was by far the most important source of capital for expansion; thus it is
likely that in Nigeria, the growth of firms and profits are closely related.
Therefore, in the regressions I have experimented with .various measures
for the dependent variable. First, present size of firm, measured by em-
ployment or value of assets in both natural and logarithmic forms, have
been. used. This specification gives one measure of growth of the firm which
is then regressed on a set of independent variables. Secondly, a direct
measure of an average compound rate of growth of employment has been used
as a dependent variable (a similar measure of growth of assets was used
which gave similar results but is not reported here). Finally, we con-
structed a rather arbitrary and subjective measure of "success" of firms
which attempted to take direct account of profitability as well as growth
of the firm. None of the measures are ideal, but there is reason to believe
that they provide at least a partial measure of the "true" dependent variable,
profit.
The data consist of observations of particular establishments, but at
least some of the variables such as education and experience should affect
the profits of any undertaking by a particular decision unit. It may well
be the case that a very successful entrepreneur maximizes his total entre-
preneurial profit by diversifying his activities among several establishments.
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And it may also be that he uses profits from one enterprise to finance
rapid expansion of some other enterprise. Therefore, the growth of any
particular establishment controlled by him may be a poor indicator of the
profitability of that establishment and of his total entrepreneurial profit.
It has also been argued by Kilby [29] and Schatz [A5] that dispersal
of activity over several businesses has been carried to an irrational extent
by many Nigerian entrepreneurs. Both considerations lead one to expect that
the measures of growth should be related positively with the proportion of
the entrepreneur's assets devoted to the establishment included in the
sample; therefore this has been included as an independent variable in the
regressions.
The first five hypotheses all suggest that there may be systematic
differences in profitability between industries. Therefore it seems ap-
propriate to include dummy variables (equal to one if the observation is
from the industry, otherwise zero) to capture specific industry effects.
The rubber processing industry in Nigeria is exceptional in having the lar-
gest of the Nigerian-owned firms. The dummy variable for this industry is
included in all of the regressions—none of the other industry dummies was
significant.
Ethnicity is taken into account by including dummy variables for each
of the major ethnic groups. However, only the variable representing the
Ibo group proved to be significant; therefore all others have been dropped
from the regressions.
The education variable is more straightforward. We have information
concerning the number of years of formal education computed by each respon-
dent. At various times we used the years of education in natural and
logarithmic forms, a four level classification, and a dummy variable equal
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to one if the entrepreneur completed six or more years of education and zero
otherwise.
Experience is dealt with by a number of variables. First, the age at
which an entrepreneur founded his business provides a measure of the number
of years or prior experience. Secondly, dummy variables were included to
reflect previous experience in trading or clerical work. (Dummy variables
for craft experience or farming were not significant and were dropped.)
Innovation is handled rather easily by a dummy variable equal to one
if the firm represented some form of innovation and zero otherwise. Ap-
proximately 20 per cent of the firms were classified as innovational where
innovation refers to establishing a new process, product, marketing method,
or business practice in the region.
Access to resources is represented by dummy variables equal to one if
more than 25 per cent of initial or expansion capital was raised through
loans. Size of the firm at time of founding provides another measure of
resource availability. The final variable, political activity, is included
as a dummy variable taking its value according to whether or not the entre-
preneur has been actively involved in party politics.
Tables 1 and 2 present the results of several alternative forms of
the regression analysis. Some relationships appear to vary systematically
between Lagos and the rest of Nigeria. Therefore separate regressions were
run and are reported here. The degree of explanation provided by the re-
gressions is greater for each group taken separately than it is for the
combined sample.
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Table 1
Regression Coefficients—Non-Lagos Respondents Only
Dependent
Variable
(1)
PEMP
(2)
LPEP
(3)
PAST
(4)
LPAS
(5)
CGE
(6)
EVAL
Independent
Variable
C -26.3873 2.4115*^ -61.6675 .7782*' .0313 3.2218'
lEMP 1.2266^^ .0179 '^ .1575 .0113*^ .0000 -.0036
RUBB 41.6476*^ .6123^ 59.6017^^ .0113^ .0424 .7428
AITB 2.7965'' .0291^ 2.7182'^ -.0018 .0133^^ .0502'
IBO 18.9913'^ .3866'^ 6.7849 .2286^ .0847'^ .3978'
OEDD -19.5933*' .0381 -12.0381^ .0299 -.0176 .1900
AGE .3617 .0045 1.0433^ .0201^^ -.0003 .0035
SCLR 9.9740 .0518 10.0794 .4379^ .0022 .0942
STRD 21.2099^^ .0351 14.9882'' .3934^ .0246 .3387'
INOV 23.5940'^ .4481^^ 35.7540^ .6861*^ .0282 .3999'
ILN 1.1026 -.1690^ 8.7053^ .0196 -.0352^ .1566
EXLN 50.7555^ .6605*^ 31.5162*^ .7651^^ .0983^^ .9107
POL 12.7545 -.0903d 15. 466 7*^ .2448 -.0449^ -.0236
N 101 101 101 101 101 94
r2 .5723 .5163 .5209 .4699 .2815 .2777
F 9 . 8160 7.8303 7.9749 6.5021 2.8738 2.5960
d.f. 12,88 12,88 12,88 12,88 12,88 12,81
Sig p<.01 p<.01 p<.01 p<.01 p<.05 p<.05
t>1.0
*t>1.3
't>1.6
^t>2.0
!Notes to Table 1 ;
Definitions of Variables
Dependent Variables:
PEMP = Current number of paid employees
LPEP = Natural log of PEMP
PAST = Present value of fixed assets in thousands of pounds
LPAS = Natural log of PAST
CGE = Annually compounded rate of growth of employment in the firm
since founding
EVAL = An index of subjective evaluation of the success of the firm
based on growth and profitability (scale ranges from one for
unsuccessful to five for very successful)
Independent Variables:
lEMP = Initial number of paid employees (at time of founding)
RUBB = Dummy variable = one if firm is in rubber processing
AITB = Percent of entrepreneur's total assets invested in this firm
(measured in intervals of 10%)
IBO = Dummy variable = one if entrepreneur's native language is Ibo
OEDD = Dummy variable = one if entrepreneur has had six or more years
of formal schooling
AGE = Age at which entrepreneur founded this firm (measured in five-year
intervals
SCLR = Dummy variable = one if entrepreneur's previous occupation was
trading
INOV = Dummy variable = one if innovations have been initiated within
this firm
ILN = Dummy variable = one if entrepreneur received 25% or more of
initial capital through loans
EXLN = Dummy variable = one if entrepreneur received 25% or more of
expansion capital through loans
POL = Dummy variable = one if entrepreneur has been active in politics
Note: The F test reported for each regression represents a test of signifi-
cance of the entire regression against the null hypothesis that the value of
the dependent variable is equal to its mean.
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Table 2
Regression Coefficients—Lagos Respondents Only
Dependent
Variable
(7)
PEMP
.(8)
LPEP
(9)
PAST
(10)
LPAS
(11)
CGE
(12)
EVAL
Independent
Variable
C 54.2856'^ 3.2749^ 49 . 8406^^ 2.1447^^ .2514^^ 4.8240'
lEMP
RUBB
AITB
.3296 • OlOl'^ 1.3693*^ .0165^ -.0059"^ -.0098'
-1.1583 -.0069 -1.0764^ .0436^ .0030 -.0063
IBO 4.4605 .1217 -2.4655 .0878 .1640^ .1915
OEDD 2.9872 -.1413 -.8406 .3009*^ .0069 -.0666
AGE -.9438'^ -.0152'^ -1.1935*^ .0234 -.0012 -.0176'
SCLR 22.7442^^ .1538 1.3124 .1158 -.0242 .0414
STRD -14.1331 -.3647^^ -17.1518^^ -.2568 -.0209 -.2957'
INOV 17.7283 .5421^ 11.7844^ .8909*^ .0934'^ .6107'
ILN 10.1562 .1212 -1.5650 .2680^ -.0033 .2301
EXLN 7.0136 .4782^ 9.3941** .6516^ .0232 .6070'
POL 45.9320*^ .5253^^ 33.7134^^ .7823^^ .0295 .3599
N 166 166 164 164 166 160
r2 .1295 .2496 .3128 .3194 .1926 .2094
F 2.0833 4.6570 6.2925 6.4357 3.3408 3.5650
d.f. 11,154 11,154 11,152 11,152 11,154 11,148
Sig p<.10 p<.01 p<.01 p<.01 p<.05 p<.01
t>1.0
t>1.3
't>1.6
t>2.0
Notes to Table 2: Same as for Table 1.
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Tables 1 and 2 present the results of two sets of regressions—one
for the non-Lagos firms and one for the Lagos firms (Lagos is the capital
and largest city in Nigeria)—using six different dependent variables and
a common set of independent variables for each set of observations.
As expected, the coefficients of the dummy variable representing the
rubber industry (including crepe processing and tire retreading) were large
and, in most cases, highly significant (there were no rubber processing
firms in Lagos). The rubber processing firms started on a large scale and
have been highly profitable but have grown less rapidly than some others
because of limitations on raw materials inputs, hence the coefficient is
somei'^hat smaller and not significantly different from zero when rate of
growth (CGE) is the dependent variable.
Initial employment is a significant determinant of the present size
of firm, measured either in terms of employment or assets, although the
absolute size of the coefficients is fairly small. It is interesting to
note, however, that initial size is not significantly related to either rate
of growth of the index of success (EVAL) which reflects both growth and
profitability.
Firms which had been innovational were larger, had grown faster, and
were more profitable than others, in conformity with prediction. In all
cases, the coefficients were positive, relatively large, and in almost all
cases statistically significant. However, one cannot jump directly to the
conclusion that returns to innovation are high since we have data only on
innovators who were successful. The incidence of innovational failure can-
not be estimated from the data at hand.
One of the crucial tests of the theory outlined earlier involves the
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importance of psychological or sociological variables as reflected in
ethnicity. In earlier regressions, groups of dummy variables for the five
ethnic groups for which I had data (see Table 1.6 for numbers of Yoruba,
Ibo, Edo, Ibibio, and Hausa— the dummy for Yoruba was omitted in each case)
were included. There was a serious problem of multicollinearity between
Edo and rubber processing, and the coefficients of variables other than
Ibo were never significant. Hence, in this group of regressions I adopted
a different specification, including only the dummy variable for Ibo. In
the non-Lagos regressions its coefficient was positive, fairly large, and
statistically significant in almost all cases, suggesting that Ibo entre-
preneurs were more successful than others. This is exactly what the existing
19psychological and ethnological data would predict.
However, there is an identification problem. All but two of the forty
Ibo entrepreneurs in this group had their businesses in the Eastern Region.
Hence we cannot differentiate between the hypothesis that Ibos are more
successful entrepreneurs and the alternative hypothesis that economic op-
portunities were more attractive in the East. The Lagos data provide a
better test, since there the structure of opportunities (except for any form
of discrimination) is identical; there we see that the coefficients of the
Ibo variable are much smaller (except for growth) and not statistically
significant although they are still positive in all cases. The high coef-
ficient for growth of employment requires explanation, since it is at
variance with the rest of the findings. One plausible hypothesis is that
in Lagos there is particularly strong pressure for Ibo entrepreneurs to
provide employment for relatives as an element of social (or family) obli-
gation. Thus, increases in employment would reflect increasing levels of
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"transfer payments" to relatives more than increase in the "real" size of
firm. But this still reflects relatively high profits.
Other variables which might be expected to influence psychological
attitudes of entrepreneurs such as father's income, status, or education
were not significant in any of the regressions in which they were included.
Certainly, the hypotheses that ethincity or family background affect at-
titudes towards entrepreneurship cannot be rejected, but neither do these
findings lend strong support to them. ~ The confounding of ethnicity and
opportunities must be considered and, furthermore, if the psychological
effects are those of conditioning attitudes towards engaging or not engaging
in entrepreneurial activity, one might expect little significant variation
within a group of individuals, all of whom had engaged in such activity.
The next group of variables (OEDD, AGE, SCLR) reflect various kinds
of experience or skill which should affect the ability of an individual to
perform successfully as an entrepreneur. The evidence with respect to
these variables is ambiguous.
Several forms of the education variable were tried since there is no
obvious a priori specification. Years of formal education, logarithmic
and exponential functions of years of schooling, various orderings of levels
of academic achievement (none, some primary, primary completed, some secon-
dary, secondary completed, post-secondary, etc.), and a dummy variable equal
to one if the entrepreneur had completed six or more years of formal schooling
were tried. The results were not sensitive to the specification of this
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variable— the dummy variable form is used in the reported regressions.
The coefficients of the education variable, however, are rather puzzling.
In the non-Lagos observations, they are statistically significant only in
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two cases in which the sign is negative and all positive values are both
small and not significant. There is a change of sign between natural num-
ber and logarithmic specifications of the size of firm variables (employ-
ment or assets), suggesting that a few very large firms in which the entre-
preneur had less than six years of formal education give rise to the nega-
tive coefficient.
What are we to make of this curious result? Does it mean that re-
sources devoted to education are being wasted in Nigeria? It is far from
clear that there should be a very strong relationship between small-scale
entrepreneurial performance and formal education. Undoubtedly literacy can
be useful, but successful entrepreneurs are in a position to hire clerks who
can read and interpret written material to them. Arithmetic ability is
useful to an entrepreneur, but many illiterate traders seem able to carry
fairly elaborate arrays of numbers in their heads. In fact, much of what
passes as formal schooling may even be detrimental, since there is excessive
emphasis on rote learning—creative ability tends to be squelched. I
would not want to push this argument too far since as businesses become of
larger scale and of greater technical complexity, skills which are normally
acquired through formal education will become important to entrepreneurs.
I have argued elsewhere that two other factors are important in explaining
this phenomenon. First, other kinds of education (apprenticeships, on-the-
job training, self-improvement courses carried out through correspondence,
and learning by doing) are important substitutes for, and_ in technical areas
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far superior to, formal schooling. Secondly, a compensatory mechanism is
probably operative. Formal schooling is required for advancement in the
high-paying and secure civil service. Several of the most successful entre-
preneurs stated that they were deterred from entering, or advancing in, the
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civil service because of their lack of fortaal qualifications, and they
indicated a strong motivation to prove to all that they could succeed in
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spite of this handicap. It is also possible that in this sample, formal
education and basic ability are inversely correlated. This would occur if,
at higher levels of education, good students were offered permanent jobs,
leaving only the bottom of the class to enter entrepreneurial careers while
bright and energetic individuals, denied an opportunity for further schooling,
turn to business as the best available alternative.
Interesting differences appear between Lagos and the rest of the
country with respect to the importance of three other variables that re-
flect other kinds of occupational experience. There is evidence that large-
scale entrepreneurs in other developing economies come predominantly from
trading backgrounds, while the earlier industrialists come from backgrounds
23in craft activities and tend to remain small-scale operators. In Nigeria
previous employment in clerical or government jobs seem also to be important
sources of entrepreneurial talent, although the majority of industrial en-
trepreneurs come from craft backgrounds. Coefficients of the dummy variables
for trading or clerical and government experience (STED and SCLR) are posi-
tive; the coefficients for trading experience are higher and more often
significant than those for clerical experience when the dependent variable
is number of employees— the relative magnitudes of the coefficients are
reversed when the natural log of number of employees is substituted as the
dependent variable, suggesting that former traders control a sizeable num-
ber of the very largest firms. But both backgrounds account for larger than
average firms.
In Lagos, former traders control smaller and less successful than
average firms, while entrepreneurs with experience in clerical or government
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work are well ahead of the rest. The obvious explanation is that the require-
ments for success are different in Lagos (the Federal Capital) since govern-
ment contracts and favors loom much more important.
This is also borne out by observing similar differences in the co-
efficients of the dummy variable reflecting political involvement (POL)
which are positive, large, and significant in Lagos, and negative or not
significantly positive outside of Lagos. It also may well be that part of
the effect attributable to clerical experience is actually accounted for
by the education of such individuals, although the simple correlation
coefficient between the two variables is only .09.
The other variable which should reflect experience is the age at which
the entrepreneur founded his business (AITB) . It would appear reasonable
to expect that individuals starting businesses at later ages would have had
more years of relevant experience in other activities, hence the sign of
the coefficient should be positive. Most of these coefficients for the
non-Lagos firms are positive, and some reach the .05 level of statistical
significance, while in Lagos most of them are negative. In either case,
the absolute magnitudes are relatively small. Again, it may be that in
Lagos political connections are more important than specific experience or
that the experience gained is not relevant to entrepreneurial success.
The final three independent variables reflect ability to gain command
over resources. Initial loans (ILN) reflect the ability of an entrepreneur
to obtain credit for establishing a firm, while the second variable (EXLN)
reflects the ability to obtain credit for expanding an existing firm. The
third variable, political involvement (POL), has already been mentioned,
but suffice it to say that in the Nigerian context prior to 1966 it seems
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plausible that capital, raw materials, or sales might be available on more
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favorable terms to an individual with political connections.
Both in Lagos and elsewhere the coefficients of ILN are small, vary
in sign, and are seldom statistically significant. Since capital markets
are highly imperfect and there are practically no large personal fortunes
to be drawn upon in Nigeria, one would expect a considerable advantage to
be obtained by individuals with access to credit which would enable them
to start firms on a larger scale. In almost all cases, even where credit
was obtained, individual savings were by far the most important source of
venture capital. There is widespread feeling among Nigerian entrepreneurs
that the virtual absence of credit institutions willing to lend to them
presents a serious obstacle to industrial development. Yet these data sug-
gest that individuals without access to credit have done as well as (or
even better than) others. This is quite consistent with observation I have
made elsewhere stating that for industries of the kind represented in this
sample (simple technology and low investment thresholds), capital was
probably not a serious obstacle since a firm could start on a small scale
and grow through reinvested profits. [26] However, the coef-
ficients of the EXLN term suggest that availability of loans for expansion
purposes may have been important. This may be partly misleading.
Again, the preponderant source of capital for expansion has come from re-
invested profits. The role of loans may be to allow expansion at a more
rapid pace than would otherwise be feasible (although the negative coef-
ficient of this term in regression (5) and the small coefficient in re-
gression (11) may cast doubt even on that) . It is more likely that given
the Nigerian institutional structure, the direction of causalty is reversed.
That is, firms which can demonstrate their success are more likely to
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obtain loans from banks or equipment suppliers. Also, there is some ten-
dency for loans to substitute for reinvestment, and many of the most
successful (and accumulation minded) entrepreneurs professed an aversion to
using credit. On the other hand, firms in shaky condition (frequently with
substantial excess capacity) are the ones which most actively seek loans
and complain loudest about the lack of credit facilities. We can establish
statistical association but not causation!
I have previously alluded to the possible misspecification of this
model in the regressions reported. Table 3 presents the results of three
alternative specifications for the non-Lagos respondents. Equation (1)
is the same one reported in Table 1, while Equations (13) and (14) are
specified somewhat differently. In particular. Equation (14) regresses
present employment on the same independent variables except innovation as
(1). The degree of explanation is about the same in the two versions, al-
though an F test indicates that the addition of innovation is statistically
significant. Comparing the two equations, it is apparent that the relative
importance of the independent variables is not much changed. Almost all
of the coefficients become larger, suggesting that most of them are also
related to innovation, but that multicollinearity between innovation and
any one of them is small (no simple correlation coefficient exceeded 0.1).
None of the previous interpretations is drastically affected.
A comparison between Equations (1) and (13) indicates that there is
not a great deal to choose between the explanatory powers of the two re-
lationships, although (1) is slightly better. Variables which appear in
both equations are of the same sign and approximate magnitude (with the
exception of AGE which is not significant in either case). However, (1)
is preferable because it includes additional variables which our theory
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Table 3
Alternative Regression Specifications—Non-Lagos Respondents
Dependent
Variable
(13)
PEMP
Independent
Variable
C 18.5097
lEMP 1.3880'
RUBB
IBO
OEDD
OED -6.6446
AGE -.0454
SCLR 24.4358
STRD 30.6296'
ILN
EXLN 51.0237'
AITB
POL 3.6061
INOV 28.1704'
N 101
r2 .5298
F 12.9600
d.f. 8,92
(1)
PEMP
(14)
PEMP
-26.3873
1.2266'
41.6476'
18.9913'
-19.5933^
.3617
9.9740
21.2099'
1.1026
50.7555'
2.7965^
12.7545
23.5940'
101
.5723
9.8160
12,188
-23.1768
1.2082'
37.5077'
20.9468'
-17.9048^
.2839
14,.9467'
26..5268'
4,,4398
51,.9236
2,.8973'
14,.6460'
101
.,5515
9.,9523
11
=
,89
t>1.0
t>1.3
't>1.6
t>2.0
Notes to Table 3 : Same as for Table 1, except that OED is own education,
scaled 1 if none, 2 if some primary, 3 if primary completed, 4 if some
secondary, 5 if secondary completed, 6 if post-secondary education.
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suggests should be of some importance. Special conditions in the rubber
processing industry (RUBB) , receipt of loans for founding the business
(ILN) , the degree of dispersal of entrepreneurial effort (AITB) , and the
effect of Ibo ethnicity (IBO) are accounted for. The form of the edc-
cation variable is different in the two equations but has negative sign in
both, and the difference in magnitude merely reflects the different scaling
of the variable (other regressions indicate little difference between the
two formulations). Controlling for the specific conditions in the rubber
industry and of Ibo ethnicity accounts for the lowering of the coefficients
of clerical and trading occupational experience and of innovation.
VI.
In this paper I have attempted to provide a framework for thinking
about entrepreneurship and economic development in a more systematic manner
than has been common. In particular, the theoretical apparatus provides an
explicit way of considering the interplay between psychological, social,
and economic variables and avoids resorting to a single-factor explanation.
In addition, non-homogeneity of projects and imperfect information are
accommodated. While few, if any, of the implications of this model will
come as a surprise to anyone who has thought about the problem in more con-
ventional economic terras, these results can only be obtained from the usual
theory of the firm by making many intuitively plausible but ad hoc and non-
rigorous modifications.
Also an attempt has been made to test some implications of the model
with Nigerian data by use of ordinary least squares regression analysis.
2
While none of the R 's are particularly high (ranging from .13 to .57), they
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do represent statistically significant degrees of explanation. Given the
necessarily crude measures of entrepreneurial performance and of the various
socio-economic independent variables, these results are rather encouraging.
Indeed, in such cross section data one would hardly expect a high
degree of explanation. [36] Much of the literature on entre-
preneurship has emphasized the importance of psychological variables which
shape the attitude of individuals towards undertaking entrepreneurial ac-
tivity. We could hope to capture these effects only insomuch as they were
systematically influenced ethnicity or father's position in society
—
ethnicity is confounded with regional variations in the structure of oppor-
tunities, and the various measures of father's position are never statis-
tically significant. Furthermore, it may well be that the appropriate com-
parison is between entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial groups, while our
data "allow comparison only between entrepreneurs varying in degree of
success." Certainly entrepreneurial performance depends on individual dif-
ferences that cannot possibly be accounted for in to to by a few imperfectly
measured socio-economic variables.
However, willingness to engage in entrepreneurial activity is not enough-
there must also be an ability to respond to opportunities, and this is in-
fluenced by specific kinds of experience and institutions which enable in-
dividuals to gain command over resources. This analysis is somewhat more
successful in illuminating such factors.
Alternative specifications of the regression model provide some insight
into the nature of the relationships. Fortunately, the coefficient estimates
are rather robust, suggesting that the conclusions drawn are quite insen-
sitive to errors of specification.
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Two lines of further research effort are indicated. First, it would
be extremely useful to have appropriately matched control groups of entre-
preneurial and non-entrepreneurial individuals in order to test important
hypotheses regarding motivational factors and secondly, the regression
model should be extended to take account of specific interaction terms.
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Appendix I
The tables in this appendix show the composition of the sample of
firms included in the analysis of Sections VIII and IX.
Table I.l
Distribution of Firms Interviewed
Industry No . Interviewed
by Harris
No . Interviewed
by Rowe
Total
Sawmilling 36 29 65
Furniture 16 18 34
Rubber Processing 10 10
Printing 16 32 48
Garment Making 6 24 30
All other industries 17 65 82
Totals 101 168 269
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Table 1.2
Distribution by Number of Employees of Firms Interviewed
Number of No. Interviewed No. Interviewed Total
Employees
10 or less
10-15
16-20
21-25
26-30
31-40
41-50
51-75
76-100
101-200
201-300
301-500
more than 500
Totals
*Data were not available from three firms.
by Harris by Rowe
5 31 36
11 39 50
12 25 37
10 12 22
11 13 24
10 15 25
9 4 13
8 10 18
11 8 19
7 4 11
6 3 9
1 1
1 1
101 165* 266*
Table 1.3
Distribution by Value of Assets of Firms Interviewed
Totals 101 164*
*Data were not available from four firms.
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Value of Assets No. Interviewed No. Interviewed Total
(fc Nigeria) by Harris by Rowe
Less than i'lOO 3 16 19
t100 1-5000 17 69 86
1:5001-10,000 24 26 50
t 10, 00 1-20, 000 18 23 ^1
t20, 001-50, 000 25 20 45
fc50, 001-100, 000 7 5 12
more than fel00,000 7 5 12
265'
Table 1.4
Distribution by Type of Organization of Firms Interviewed
Type of
Organization
No . Interviewed
by Harris
No. Interviewed
by Rawe
Total
Proprietorship 41 95 135
Partnership 14 43 57
Private Limited Company 42 30 72
Public Limited Company 4 4
Totals 101 168 269
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Table 1.5
Regional Distribution of Firms Interviewed
Region Number of Firms
Lagos metropolitan 168
West** 35
Mid-West 16
East 39
North 11
Total 269
* includes some parts of the Western region
**not including those parts in the Lagos metropolitan area
Table 1.6
Distribution of Entrepreneurs Interviewed
According to Ethnic Group (Tribe)
Ethnic Group Number
Yoruba 172
Ibo 58
Edo 24
Ibibio, Efok, and Ijaw 5
Hausa 7
Other 3
Total 269 .
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1. The literature is extensive, but the main lines of approach can be found
in Cole [15], Knight [30], and Schumpeter [46]. Other important works in-
clude [16], [19], [20], [31], [33], and [44].
2. See the typologies proposed by Danhof quoted by Brozen [8], Cole [15],
Alexander [2], and Hughes [28].
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3. This definition follows closely that of Harbison's "organization" [23]
or Hirschman's "ability to make development decisions" [27].
4. Greenhut [21] argues that profits are a functional, not a residual,
return to entrepreneurship. However, he attributes all differential re-
turns to decision makers as reflecting differential skills. To a large
extent this is true, but he seems to go too far,
5. If a single authority or decision-making unit undertakes all investment
in the economy, there is no problem. In that case, outlined by Chenery
[13] , "The related decision rule is to rank projects by their SMP [Social
Marginal Product] and go down the list until the funds to be allocated are
exhausted. Alternatively, any project having an SMP above a given level
can be approved."
6. I am indebted to Jerome Rothenberg for suggesting this approach.
7. Note that projects which involve producing a given output at lower cost
than existing methods will release factors of production. It is tacitly
assumed that these factors will find alternative employment. In an economy
with unemployment, adoption of such a project could lead to lower output
through income effects. AY is defined as the incremental output associated
with the exploitation of the jth project. There is no reason why AY. cannot
be negative.
Also note that only new projects (including expansion of existing pro-
duction units) are being considered in this model. Thus the sum of the AY.'s
is the change in output arising from the exploitation of new projects.
8. This approach is similar to that employed by Lancaster [32] in describing
the choice set of a consumer.
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9. This follows recent works on the managerial firm, e.g. Harris [37] and
Williamson [47] , which postulate a utility function for the firm.
10. This notation and argument follows Pearce [43].
11. A similar approach is taken by Mortenson [39] in explaining unemploy-
ment duration. He shows that in a world where information is incomplete
and can be obtained only at a cost (by searching) , a rational individual will
select a cut-off wage such that any offer below this level is rejected
(any offer above this level is accepted) and the cut-off point is revised
in light of further information.
12. "For one, the actor [entrepreneur] does not really know all the alter-
natives: he must find them out, and for this purpose, a period of search
is necessary. Secondly, the actor does not know all the consequences, and
has neither the time nor the skill to figure them out." P. Lazars field,
quoted by McClelland [38], p. 237.
13. Two papers by Campbell, [11] [12], provide particularly interesting
treatments of perception in a cross-cultural context.
The need for identifying individuals' subjective probabilities is men-
tioned by Arrow [3], However, this is necessary only if we are concerned
with the choice itself, distinct from the consequences of the choice for
the economy according to Georges cu-Roegen [18]. By concentrating on the
probability of a project being exploited within the economy rather than on
the probability of a particular decision unit's exploiting a project, our
neglect of the perception problem is justified.
14. See [41].
46.
15. See [1].
16. See [42].
17. The principal problem encountered was an absence of information con-
cerning the universe of indigenously owned manufacturing establishments.
Although an industrial directory had been prepared for the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry, it was incomplete, inaccurate, and nationality of
ownership of firms was not indicated. Hence, it seemed reasonable to con-
centrate on specific industries which were known to have a high degree of
Nigerian participation, wide geographical distribution, and a range of firm
sizes. One could easily gain information about the existence of competitive
firms from respondents, thereby giving quite accurate coverage of those in-
dustries.
18. Footwear and baking were the only major industries omitted which satis-
fied the above criteria for inclusion. These were deliberately excluded
because comprehensive industry studies, P. Kilby, [29], and E. W. Nafziger,
[40], had been recently undertaken and their results were available.
19. The relevant ethnological literature is reviewed and hypotheses re-
garding n-achievement levels tested by LeVine [34].
20. See Table 3 for an alternative specification of the education variable.
21. Harris, [24], Chapter IX. See also A. Callaway, [9], [10], discussions
of non- formal education. S. Bowles [5] presents estimates of returns to
education in Northern Nigeria which are positive and quite high.
22. See T. Geiger and W. Armstrong, [17], Chapter II and Appendix I.
47.
23. See A. Alexander, for a good review of this literature [2].
24. Two rather different specifications are plausible. One is to keep
the entire set of dummy variables relating to a single conceptual variable
(e.g. prior occupation) and to test the significance of the entire set by
means of an F test, not paying attention to the significance of any single
dummy variable alone. However, problems of artificial multicollinearity
arise from including large numbers of dummy variables in regression. C. Lin,
[35] , suggested an alternative approach which would compress the dummy
variables into a single vector for each effect, allowing estimation of both
a constant and complete sets of effects for each underlying variable. Un-
fortunately, problems arose with the procedure and it had to be abandoned.
The alternative specification adopted in the regressions reported in this
paper is only to include those particular dummy variables which are "impor-
tant" in the sense that they are significantly dissimilar to the other dummy
variables in the group (e.g. rubber processing is quite different from all
of the other industries which show less variation among themselves).
25. See Henry Bretton, [6] and [7], pp. 81-2.
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